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“Sustainable” and “Organic” Regulatory System
1

Jerry W. Markham

“Credit is suspicion asleep”
2

-William Gladstone
I. INTRODUCTION

The Nation is now in the midst of one of the greatest financial crises in
its history. Much of the blame for this condition is being placed on the
bursting of the residential real estate bubble, which was fueled in large part
by the reckless expansion of subprime mortgage lending. Those mortgages
began defaulting in droves as the Federal Reserve Board drove up interest
rates, causing massive losses at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan
Stanley, Citigroup, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Countrywide Financial
Group, American International Group and Merrill Lynch, to name a few.
Those losses were shocking but paled in comparison to the failures of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and the placing of Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae into conservatorship. Massive bailout packages for the financial service firms failed to restart lending, the country slipped into recession and
unemployment soared. The subprime crisis had other ripple effects. The
Dow Jones Industrial average was down 47 percent on February 19, 2009
3
from the high of 14,087 that was reached on October 1, 2007. This devas1

Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida.
Quoted in AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
336 (2007).
3
E.S. Browning, Market Hits New Crisis Low, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A1.
2
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tated retirement savings, college and other endowments, and every other
investor in the market.
On the other side of the equation were the subprime borrowers. They
too were devastated by the subprime crisis as their adjustable rate mortgages (which had been originally issued at low “teaser” rates) reset at unaffordable levels. Foreclosures became an epidemic in many communities
across the country, Florida being one of the worst centers for those sad
events. Hispanics were also a particular target for subprime lenders. Hispanic homeownership in the United States grew by 47 percent between
2000 and 2007, compared to an overall homeownership increase of 8 per4
cent. Tellingly, that growth was fueled by the fact that some 47 percent of
mortgage loans to Hispanics were subprime and many of those loans are
5
now being foreclosed. The African-American community has also been
hard hit by the subprime crisis. Over one half of mortgage loans to AfricanAmericans in 2006 were subprime, and they too are facing massive foreclo6
sures.
These problems have been blamed on flaws in the financial regulatory
structure, and Congress has now begun the process of restructuring that
7
regulation. Hopefully, but not likely, that process will include an objective
assessment of how we came to this condition and what changes are needed
to deal specifically with those problems. This symposium addresses these
issues from both the lenders’ and borrowers’ perspectives. The FIU Law
Review is to be commended for attacking these problems from both viewpoints and for attracting such a fine group of scholars to address legal issues
raised by this crisis. This Introduction to the symposium will provide a
description of the subprime mortgage market, discuss the flaws in the financial system that led to the present crisis, and it will then add a few cautionary suggestions on regulatory reform.
II. SUBPRIME LOANS
There are no uniform standards for classifying a loan as subprime.
However, a loan is generally viewed to fall into the subprime category if the
borrower falls within one of the three following categories: (1) those with a
poor credit history; (2) those with no credit history; and (3) borrowers who
4
Susan Schmidt & Maurice Tamman, Housing Push for Hispanics Spawns Wave of Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at A1.
5
Algernon Austin, Subprime Mortgages Are Nearly Double for Hispanics and African Americans,
ECONOMIC
POLICY
INSTITUTE
(June
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/entry/webfeatures_snapshots_20080611/.
6
Gail Russell Chaddock, A Housing Rescue Nears - But for Whom?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 22, 2008, at §USA1.
7
Some pretty dramatic proposals are already on the table. See The Department of the Treasury,
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008) (proposing a massive restructuring of financial regulation into an “objectives” based regulatory system).
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have existing credit but are over extended. Factors considered in classifying a loan as subprime include credit history, household debt-to-income
ratio, and combined loan-to-value ratio for home equity loans and other
9
mortgage debt. FICO credit scores are also used to identify subprime bor10
rowers.
Subprime lending is risky lending because of a high likelihood of default. By definition, such borrowers are poor credit risks, necessarily resulting in higher interest rates and fees to cover those risks. In contrast to the
subprime borrower classification, “prime” (A-Credit) borrowers have
strong credit scores, allowing them to obtain the most competitive interest
rates and mortgage terms.
Historically, the subprime market was avoided by large commercial
banks because of the default risk. As a result, subprime borrowers, until
recent years, were serviced by non-conventional lenders and were often the
11
targets of predatory lending practices. Government policy sought to
change that market by encouraging, even forcing, conventional lenders to
make subprime mortgage loans to the poor. The Home Mortgage Disclo12
sure Act of 1975 (“HMDA”), for example, required banking institutions in
metropolitan areas to disclose their mortgage loans by classification and
geographic location. This was an effort to expose the practice of “redlining,” in which banks concentrated their lending in wealthier neighborhoods.
Individuals living in those mostly white neighborhoods generally had

8
Evan M. Gilreath, Note, The Entrance of Banks Into Subprime Lending: First Union and the
Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149 (1999).
9
United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D. Mass. 1998). Some
subprime borrowers are “house rich” but “cash poor” because of equity built up in their house. In re
First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006).
10 As one court noted:

most lenders, use a credit score system called ‘FICO.’ Named for the system’s creator, Fair Isaac
Credit Organization, FICO refers to a method for calculating a borrower's credit worthiness.
FICO’s workings are largely proprietary, but based on the information in a credit bureau’s files—
e.g., credit card usage and payment history, other revolving loan history, installment loan history,
previous bankruptcy, judgments, and liens—FICO returns a score between 300 and 800. The
higher the score, the more creditworthy the borrower; the more creditworthy the borrower, the less
likely the borrower is to default.
Though ‘subprime’ has no universal definition, . . . industry custom regarded 660 as the primesubprime dividing line Further, the US median score is 720. The dispersion is such that only 27%
of the population has a score below 650 and 15% of the population scores below 600.
In re Countrywide Financial Corporation Securities Litigation, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1146-47, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102000 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (internal citations omitted). FICO scores are based on reports generated by the three large credit reporting groups: Equifax, Experian and TransUnion. PAUL
MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME, HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND
CREDIT CRISIS 41, n.5 (2008).
11 For a discussion of predatory lending practices see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002).
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2007).
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higher incomes and lower default rates than poorer neighborhoods where
13
minorities were often concentrated.
HMDA was followed by the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”)
14
of 1977. It required banks to meet the credit needs of minorities in their
15
communities. Banking regulators scored banks on their CRA compliance,
ranking them from “outstanding” to “substantial non-compliance.” That
CRA score was required to be considered by banking regulators before approving bank mergers. Activist groups and state regulators pressed banks to
make more subprime loans as a condition for the approval of their merg16
ers.
The banks at first resisted the government-inspired effort to force them
to make loans to subprime borrowers, especially since such borrowers
posed large credit risks. However, in business, a failure to grow is considered death, and the banking model for the last several years has been to
merge as the only way of growth. Banks desperate for mergers made
pledges of hundreds of billions of dollars of CRA loans to regulators in
17
order to assure approval of their mergers. The government made it easy
for the banks to obtain loans to meet these commitments by giving CRA
credit for purchases of subprime mortgages originated by non-bank sub18
prime lenders.
Merger-hungry Bank of America announced that it was making a 10year CRA subprime lending pledge of $750 billion when it merged with

13

See generally National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing this prac-

tice).
14

12 U.S.C. §§2901 et seq. (2007).
See generally Joseph Moore, Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on Bank Mergers, 1
N.C. BANKING INST. 412 (1997) (describing this legislation and the problems it engendered).
16 LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 399 (3d ed. 2008) (hereinafter “Regulation of Banking Financial
Service Activities”).
17 Community activist groups also demanded funding from banks as a condition for their not
protesting their mergers. Since mergers were the principal growth mechanism for large banks, many of
them gave into this CRA “extortion.” Senator Phil Gramm from Texas inserted a provision in the
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act in 1999 that required reports to be filed disclosing any CRA extortion payments (12 U.S.C. §1831y) in the hope that disclosure would embarrass those groups and keep such
demands to a minimum. However, that provision did not slow the growth of subprime lending. JERRY W.
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM
553 (2005). Interestingly, efforts were made to extend the CRA to mutual funds during the Clinton
administration. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS, AN INSIDER’S VIEW 151-52 (2008). It
was not clear, however, how they would invest in their communities, since their investors are usually
nationwide. Fortunately, this proposal was not pushed through Congress, and the mutual funds were not
forced to load up on subprime securities. Had they been required to do so, the economy surely would
have been destroyed entirely.
18 Address by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner, The Community Reinvestment Act
and the Recent Mortgage Crisis, Before the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum, Washington D.C., on Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
kroszner20081203a.htm.
15
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19

FleetBoston Financial Corp. in 2003. JPMorgan Chase made a larger
$800 billion CRA pledge when it merged with Bank One Corp. The merger
of Citibank and the Travelers Group in 1999 resulted in a ten-year $115
20
billion CRA pledge. Washington Mutual made a CRA pledge of $120 bil21
lion in its 1998 acquisition of HF Ahmanson & Co.
Both the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations also pushed toward
more subprime lending by two giant government sponsored enterprises
22
(“GSEs”), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. By 2000, about 50 percent of
19

Craig Lender, In Brief: B of A Chief Raps CRA Overhaul, AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 26, 2004,

20

REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, supra note 16, at 405-06.
Jaret Seiberg, Minority Report, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 3, 2003.
As was reported in congressional hearings:

at 8.
21
22

One important turning point was the year 1995. The Clinton Administration embarked on a major
policy, the National Homeownership Strategy (which led to the creation of the National Partners in
Homeownership), designed to increase homeownership rates by encouraging broader financing
among other things. At the same time, the Federal Reserve issued new regulations under the
Community Reinvestment Act that, in the words of the Federal Reserve Governor who wrote the
regulations, set up soft quotas on lending in underserved areas. Another quasi-government agency,
the public-private Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, also helped set the stage for higher
leverage in the housing industry. In 1995, it adopted a model down payment program with a 5 percent standard at a time. The Chairman of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation is by tradition a Federal Reserve Governor, which effectively puts the government stamp of approval on any
program. These relaxed standards, combined with a growing economy, allowed the underpinnings
of the housing market to begin to erode. . . .
The requirement that homebuyers make significant down payments was eliminated in the 1990's.
The National Partners in Homeownership (NPH) urged 13 and approved increasingly larger reductions in requirements. 'The partnership should support continued federal and state funding of targeted homeownership subsidies for households that would not otherwise be able to purchase
homes. Notwithstanding the growing number of high loan-to-value mortgage products available
today, many households, particularly low-and moderate-income families, will need subsidies to
supplement down payment and closing funds or to reduce the monthly obligation on a home purchase mortgage'. 'In 1989 only 7 percent of home mortgages were made with less than 10 percent
down payment. By August 1994, low down payment mortgage loans had increased to 29 percent'.
This trend continued unabated throughout the 1990's so by 1999, over 50% of mortgages had
down payments of less than 10%. In 1976, the average down payment by first time homebuyers
was 18%, by 1999 that down payment had fallen to 12.6%. In 1999, more than 5% of all residential mortgages had no equity or had negative home-equity. Eliminating down payment barriers has
created a homeownership option for Americans who previously were forced to rent, due to savings
or credit issues. Over the past decade, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have reduced required down
payments on loans that they purchase in the secondary market. Those requirements have declined
from 10% to 5% to 3% and in the past few months Fannie Mae announced that it would follow
Freddie Mac's recent move into the 0% down payment mortgage market. Although they are buying
low down payment loans, those loans must be insured with 'private mortgage insurance' (PMI). On
homes with PMI, even the closing costs can now be borrowed through unsecured loans, gifts, or
subsidies. This means that not only can the buyer put zero dollars down to purchase a new house
but also that the mortgage can finance the closing costs.
The Bush Administration continued the push to expand home ownership, and in 2002 President
Bush adopted a specific goal of increasing the number of minority homeowners by 5.5 million by the
end of the decade. The Federal Housing Agency had also lowered their standards and required only a 3
percent down payment to receive a government-backed FHA loan, and even this could be paid by a
third party. As the housing sector started to pick up strength on the back of low interest rates and the
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23

their portfolios were subprime products. That policy was carried forward
24
by the Bush administration. The 1992 Housing bill set “targets” for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac to meet in making mortgages available to low and
moderate income borrowers. Those targets were steadily increased, reaching 42 percent of these GSEs total lending by 1997. The result was that
subprime lending grew from about 5 percent of all residential mortgage
25
loans in 1994 to almost 20 percent by 2007.
This figure did not provide the whole picture of the risks being injected into the system. Loans rated just above subprime were classified as
“Alt-A” loans. The borrower in an Alt-A had an above subprime FICO
score, but there was some defect in the loan such as little or no documentation (“no-doc” or “low-doc” loans) of the borrower’s creditworthiness or
other defects. In “stated-income loans,” borrowers were allowed to state
their income without documentation, earning them the sobriquet of “liar
26
loans.” By 2006, 40 percent of all new mortgage originations were either
27
subprime or Alt-A.
III. BEHIND THE GROWTH OF SUBPRIME LENDING
The Federal Reserve Board has contended that the CRA did not cause
the subprime crisis because many subprime loans did not have CRA
28
credit. However, that claim overlooks the fact that the CRA and government policy required and legitimatized subprime lending by institutions that
had previously shied away from such business because of the risk it pre2003 turn in the macroeconomy, the government pushed for even easier standards. On January 19, 2004,
President Bush proposed eliminating the FHA's paltry 3 percent down payment with his ‘ZeroDownpayment Initiative,’ which would have allowed 150,000 people in the program's first year to take
an FHA loan with no money down. While this proposal was not enacted, the private sector had long
been following the government's lead and, in this bull market, was determined to outdo it. Rapidly rising
home prices would make zero down loans available on a massive scale. By 2005, a remarkable 43
percent of all first time homeowners put zero down or took out a mortgage in excess of the value of the
home. If home prices were rising 10 percent a year, a zero down loan would gain a 10 percent equity
stake in just 12 months. Or so the logic went.
Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector Before the Committee of Senate Congressional Oversight
Panel, Jan. 14, 2009, (statement of Marc Summerlin, Managing Member and Co-Founder, Lindsey
Group) available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/news/2901951.html.
23 The Subprime Lending Bias, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008, at A14.
24 Howard Husock, Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A49. (By
2005, HUD required that 45 percent of all the loans bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be loans to
borrowers with low and moderate incomes. HUD required further that Fannie and Freddie buy 32 percent of the loans in their portfolios from people in central cities and other underserved areas and that 22
percent of the loans they buy be to ‘very low income families or families living in low-income
neighborhoods.’).
25 REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, supra note 16, at 413.
26 Greg Griffin, Local Lender Key in Meltdown Risky Mortgages, Aurora Loan Services’ Fall
Contributed to Lehman's Bankruptcy, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at A-01.
27 Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector, supra note 22.
28 Address by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner, supra note 18.
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sented. The government then opened the door, pushed the banks through
and the banks then gorged themselves on what they believed to be a legitimate, socially responsible business for which they could model and hedge
30
for its inherent risk. Actually, the process might be better likened to supplying an alcoholic with the keys to the liquor cabinet and then forcing him
to drink as much as possible. Whatever the case, although initially forced
into the market by the government, investment banks soon found the business to their liking. By 2001, as the result of the CRA and other efforts, ten
31
of the twenty-five largest subprime lenders were banks or their affiliates.
Historically, subprime and Alt-A loans were more costly to the lender
32
to originate, sell, and service than conventional prime loans. Nevertheless, subprime loans did have their attractions. As with other mortgages,
the lender made profits based on the spread between the funds it borrowed
and those it lent to the subprime borrower. Subprime interest rates had a
spread of 300 or more basis points over conventional loans, and the high
origination and other fees charged for subprime loans tempted lenders to
33
originate large amounts of subprime loans. However, the default risk was
traditionally too much for the appetite of the conventional investment
banks. That problem was solved through securitization, which made meeting CRA pledges easy and enticed investment banks to plunge into this
market. Once there, investment banks never looked back. They found the
securitization process for subprime loans to be a profitable and enticing
business. The investment banks then went on a binge of subprime originations and securitizations.
In a securitization, mortgages “warehoused” (purchased) by an investment bank from mortgage originators such as non-bank lenders and
mortgage brokers are pooled into collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”)
by a special purpose entity (“SPE”). Ownership interests in that pool are
then sold to investors or are used to fund asset backed commercial paper
34
programs (“ABCPs”). This effectively sold the pooled mortgages to the
SPE that in turn sold them to investors as a pool, generating cash for new
29 Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan testified before Congress in October
2008 that: “It’s instructive to go back to the early stages of the subprime market, which has essentially
emerged out of the CRA.” Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,
2009, at A17.
30 As former Senator Phil Gramm recently opined: “It was not just that CRA and federal housing
policy pressured lenders to make risky loans—but that they gave lenders the excuse and regulatory
cover.” Id.
31 Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, supra note 16, at 412.
32 United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing increased costs of subprime loans).
33 See generally United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 192.
34 See FDIC v. Bakkebo, 506 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing this process). For a description
of an ABCP program, see NationsBank, N.A. v. Commercial Financial Services, 268 B.R. 579 (N.D.
Okla. 2001).
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loans and moving the pooled loans off the bank’s balance sheet. The SPE
arrangement created a funding mechanism into which hundreds of billions
35
of CRA and other subprime mortgages were eventually dumped. Perhaps
not ironically, Bear Stearns made the first CRA securitized offering in 1997,
36
and Freddie Mac guaranteed it.
Before investors would invest in these CDOs, they had to be assured
that the investment was sound. As already noted, a subprime loan is by
definition inherently risky. Financial engineers responded to that concern
by providing differing payment streams from the SPE. The lower tranches
in those payment schemes were required to absorb losses from defaults
from non-government guaranteed subprime loans before the upper tranches
could experience losses. Additional credit protection could be gained from
37
credit default swaps (“CDSs”) or credit insurance from the so-called
38
monoline insurance companies.
Those protections convinced the rating agencies, which modeled for
defaults, to give the upper tranches (commonly called “super seniors”) of
39
the CDOs a Triple-A rating, the gold standard for creditworthiness. That
AAA rating made these super seniors highly marketable, and they were sold
35 Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social Responsibility in the
New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (2000) (describing the growth of CRA securitizations).
“Warehouse” loans were also made by the investment banks to non-bank subprime originators in order
to fund the loan to the homeowner. As one source noted:

In 2002, five of the seven largest subprime originators in the land were nonbanks (Ameriquest,
Household Finance, New Century, Option One and Homecomings), which meant they needed to
borrow large sums of money to originate loans either through their branches or independent loan
brokers. A warehouse line was a big loan—nothing more, nothing less—but without it there was
no fuel to fire the origination machine that the subprime industry would turn into.
PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA: CHAIN OF BLAME, HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE
AND CREDIT CRISIS 183-184 (2008) [hereinafter MUOLO & PADILLA].
36 Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21; Editorial, The Subprime Lending Bias, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008 at A14.
37 A credit default swap has been defined as:
a common type of credit derivative in which the protection buyer makes a fixed payment to the
protection seller in return for a payment that is contingent upon a “credit event” —such as a bankruptcy—occurring to the company that issued the security (the “reference entity”) or the security
itself (the “reference obligation”). The contingent payment is often made against delivery of a
“deliverable obligation” —usually the reference obligation or other security issued by the reference entity—by the protection buyer to the protection seller. This delivery is known as the “physical settlement.”
Deutsche Bank AG v. Ambac Credit Products LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45322, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
38 The monoline insurance companies initially provide credit guarantees for municipal bonds, but
extended its guarantee business to mortgage backed securities, including subprime pools. Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monolineinsurance.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
39 For a description of super seniors and their attractions, see UBS AG, Shareholder Report on
UBS’s Write-Downs §4.2.3 (2008).
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to investors and financial institutions all over the world. They were particu40
larly popular with European banks. The lower tranches were sold to investors who either accepted their exposure or hedged them with CDSs.
The subprime market was expanded massively through the securitization of subprime loans. Indeed, most subprime loans were securitized after
41
their origination. This left the investors in the CDOs holding the bag in
the event of a default. A critical side effect to that transfer of risk was that
loan originators such as mortgage brokers had no incentive to assure that
the mortgage holder’s already risky credit status was properly vetted.
Rather, mortgage brokers were paid a “yield spread premium” that gave
them an incentive to originate no matter how shaky the credit of the bor42
rower.
IV. SUBPRIME DANGERS
The investment banks initially just made warehouse loans to subprime
lenders in order to fund their originations and bought those originations for
securitizations. The investment banks then began purchasing the subprime
mortgage originators themselves, with disastrous results for Merrill Lynch,
43
Citigroup, Wachovia, and others. This should come as no surprise. There
had been an earlier subprime crisis in 1998-1999 during which large losses
were experienced. That crisis resulted in the failure of several large sub44
Their failure was
prime lenders that had become public companies.
blamed on increased competition that resulted in a decline in credit quality,
45
which is exactly what happened in the present crisis. A large commercial
40

As one article noted:
The CDO structure depended on the concept of layered risk. The securities in the “super senior”
top tier were considered low risk and attracted the highest ratings. In return for their safety, these
bonds paid the lowest interest rate. The reverse was true at the other end; the lower tiers absorbed
the first losses in the case of loan defaults. For accepting extra risk, investors in these tiers earned
a higher interest rate.

Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades And Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at AO1.
See also James Quinn, Bond Fund Titan Seeks $5bn for Mortgage-Backed Debts, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 28, 2008, at City5 (describing effort to buy distressed super seniors from European
banks).
41 By 2008, some $1.5 trillion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages had been securitized. Gretchen
Morgenson, Everyone Out of the Security Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at BU1.
42 Bob Tedeschi, Report Piles Blame on Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at RE10.
43 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 183-84.
44 Id. at 44-45, 239.
45 As one report noted:
A number of factors have contributed to the recent decline in the health of the subprime industry.
Increased competition is one of the most important factors. In 1994, there were only ten companies in the subprime lending business. By March of 1998, that figure had grown to fifty. Increased competition in the subprime market caused deterioration in overall credit quality. The proliferation of subprime lenders forced companies to go deeper into the credit pool to find customers.
This reduction in credit quality has increased the risk of default. Moreover, consumer defaults have
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bank was also badly burned by that first subprime crisis. Before its merger
with Wachovia, First Union purchased the Money Store for $2.1 billion.
However, First Union had to take a write down of $1.8 billion on that busi46
ness after the subprime market had its first crash.
Inexplicably, investment banks ignored that warning when they entered the subprime market in the new century. As Robert Rubin, the former
Secretary of the Treasury and senior executive at Citigroup, noted in his
autobiography (before the subprime crisis into which he had helped lead
Citigroup) there is a tendency in human nature to engage in “financial excess” and that humans have a “remarkable failure to draw lessons from past
experience. . . . The proclivity to go to excess is a phenomenon of collective
47
psychology that seems to repeat itself again and again.” That warning
proved to be prophetic for Citigroup and other investment bankers in their
rush for the yields available from the high paying subprime pools, which
had now been legitimatized by the federal government.
In 2003, investment bankers purchased and issued over $230 billion in
48
subprime securitizations, almost double that of the prior year. At first, the
49
investment bankers were well rewarded for this effort. They were happily
reporting large profits in 2004 and 2005 from subprime lending and pro50
prietary trading activities. Their executives were given huge bonuses, but
51
then the market turned.
V. THE CRISIS
There was danger here that was real and apparent. Subprime loans
were often funded by the lender at short-term rates and then loaned to the
subprime borrower at higher long-term rates. This allowed a profit from
been on the rise as the average American has taken on an increasing amount of debt. The industry
was also hurt by the entrance of inexperienced subprime lenders who incorrectly evaluated customers' credit ratings and thereby made bad loan decisions. As the stock prices of subprime lenders dropped because of financial difficulties, institutions were less willing to provide the capital to
subprime companies to finance further loans.
Evan M. Gilreath, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lending: First Union and The Money Store, 3
N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 153-54 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
46 Riva D. Atlas, Wachovia Hopes SouthTrust Deal Repeats Success of 2001 Merger, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2004, at C1.
47 ROBERT E. RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD, TOUGH CHOICES FROM
WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 318 (Paperback ed. 2004).
48 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 240.
49 Financial service firms contributed on average 22 percent of all earnings by S&P 500 companies between 1995 and the subprime crisis. The stock prices of financial service firms nearly doubled
between 2003 and 2007. Gretchen Morgenson, The End of Banking as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2009, at BU1, 6.
50 See Louise Story, After a Rough Year, Nearly Half of Wall Street Bank Profits Are Gone, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2008, at C1 (describing those profits).
51 See Michael J. de la Merced, Even for Rungs Below the Top, Goldman Bonuses Were Hefty,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C2 (describing the compensation of some of these executives).
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the spread between the two, i.e. long term interest rates are normally higher
than short-term rates. As long as yield spreads are constant, that spread
creates a steady stream of profits from the CDOs created to fund subprime
mortgages. However, that advantage becomes a liability when short-term
52
interest rates rise faster than long term rates, cutting that profit margin.
That is exactly what happened when the Federal Reserve Board raised
short-term interest rates, with seventeen straight increases between June
53
2004 and June 2006.
Those interest rate increases had a twofold effect. CDOs funded with
short-term paper were no longer profitable and refunding became a problem
with the arrival of the credit crunch in 2007. Those rate increases also
placed pressure on subprime borrowers because many of those loans were
offered at “teaser” rates that would be reset at much higher rates than sub54
prime lenders would be unable to afford. In the rising market accompanying the real estate bubble, borrowers had been able to refinance their homes,
pulling additional equity of the homes that allow them to service their debt
and buy other, often unneeded, items. They lost that ability as housing
prices declined when the bubble broke.
Subprime borrowers then became delinquent on their loans in increasingly large numbers and many of those delinquent loans went into foreclosure. By December 2008, about 4.5 percent of all first lien mortgages were
90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure. One in ten Alt-A mortgages

52

MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 115.
Shares Close Mixed as Earnings Reports Fail to Inspire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at C1.
54 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at MM36. Mortgage loans
with non-conventional terms were authorized in 1982 when Congress passed the Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA”) (12 U.S.C. §§3801-06). That legislation attempted to stimulate
lending by loosening regulatory restrictions that had previously allowed savings and loan associations to
make only conventional fixed-rate, fixed-term loans. AMTPA allowed home equity lines of credit as
second mortgages on residences and adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”). It also allowed loans with an
initial low interest rate (the "teaser" rate) that was adjusted after a short period into a variable index
interest rate plus an additional number of points. For example, a so-called “2/28 ARM” had a fixed rate
for two years and then adjusted to a floating rate for the remaining twenty-eight years of the loan. The
spread over the index rate then usually ranges from 300 to 600 basis points. This is called “payment
shock” in the business. Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37569, at
nn. 10-11 (July 10, 2007).
Another innovation was the “reverse mortgage.” These mortgages allow individuals to take out a
loan that would pay them either a large lump sum or periodic payments that were secured by the equity
in the home. Thus, instead of the homeowner paying the bank a monthly mortgage payment, the bank
would make payments to the homeowner. Of course, the homeowner was spending the equity accumulated in the house, which was inflated by the ongoing market boom. These mortgages were particularly
popular with the elderly who saw it as a good way to cash in on their home without moving. “Reverse
mortgages” were widely sold to seniors by retired actors that allowed elderly homeowners to take draw
downs on the equity accumulated in their homes over the years. These payments assured participating
seniors a guaranteed source of income. Reverse mortgage payments were not taxable, and repayment did
not have to be made until the senior left or sold the residence. See generally Wolfert v. Transamerica
Home First, 439 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing reverse mortgages).
53
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were delinquent and more than 20 percent of subprime mortgages were
delinquent or in foreclosure. The number of foreclosures in 2008 reached
nearly 2.25 million, up from an annual rate of only about one million per
55
year before the subprime crisis. In Lee County, Florida, judges were au56
thorizing 1,000 foreclosures per day.
The effects of the Federal interest rate increases were devastating to
the large investment banks. The thirty years following the first Bear
Stearns offering of securitized subprime loans would destroy that venerable
57
firm and push Wall Street into the subprime crisis. Merrill Lynch then had
to be rescued by Bank of America, which then had to be rescued by the
58
government as losses at Merrill Lynch continued to grow. The banking
giant Wachovia was brought down by losses from a subprime lender Wa59
chovia had bought to gain market share in such lending. Wachovia had to
60
be rescued by Wells Fargo. Washington Mutual failed and was rescued by
61
JPMorgan Chase. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conserva62
torship. European banks, including UBS AG suffered massive losses.
63
The Royal Bank of Scotland had to be nationalized.
In a market test of systemic risk, the government allowed Lehman
Brothers to fail, which touched off a frightful panic in the credit markets
64
and on the stock exchanges. A horrifying run began on the money market
funds, after the Reserve Primary Fund announced that it would “break-thebuck” because of losses from exposures to Lehman Brothers debt. That
panic was quelled only after the government announced it would be guaran65
teeing money market funds.
55 Ben S. Bernanke, Address at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets (Dec.4, 2008). The percentage of Alt-A loans that were delinquent quadrupled in April
2008 over the prior year. Vikas Bajaj, Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2008, at A1. FRB: Charge-Off Rates; All Banks, NSA, The charge-off rate for residential mortgages by commercial banks went from 0.09% in 1996 to 1.45% in March of 2008.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ releases/chargeoff/chgallnsa.htm. (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
56 Michael Corkery, A Florida Court’s ‘Rocket Docket’ Blasts through Foreclosure Cases, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at A1.
57 Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend That Wall Street Died—Ties That Long United Strongest
Firms Unraveled as Lehman Sank Toward Failure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A1.
58 Dan Fitzpatrick, et al., Crisis on Wall Street—Bank Stress: BofA’s Latest Hit—Treasury Injects
$20 Billion More; Stock at 1991 Level, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at C1.
59 Michael Moss & Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Pariahs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1.
60 Eric Dash & Ross Sorkin, Regulators Push for Sale of Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008,
at A15.
61 Peter Y. Hong, State Foreclosure Pace Slows, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at C2.
62 Paulson Sees Changes for Freddie and Fannie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at B6.
63 David Olive, 2008 A Year of Turmoil, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 30, 2008, at BO1.
64 Jo Becker, et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2008, at A1.
65 Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Funds Are a Refuge, Right?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at
BU17.
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In total, large investment banks wrote down over $150 billion in sub66
prime mortgages by March 2008, and that amount was expected to double.
67
The stock values of most large financial institutions were smashed. The
last two large independent investment banking firms, Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs, converted to bank-holding companies in order to qualify
68
for government bailouts. Citigroup also sustained massive loses from
subprime structured investment vehicles (“Sivs” or more appropriately
“SIEVs”) and was saved only by a massive federal rescue package. That
giant financial supermarket, which had become a market model, is being
69
split up into more traditional lines. The contagion spread to the American
International Group, which had to be bailed out by the federal government
70
with a $170 billion rescue package.
Credit markets were frozen and liquidity became absent. The federal
government mounted a momentous effort to deal with this crisis. Over a
period of several months, interest rates were slashed down to near zero,
71
unprecedented in U.S. history. Credit lending facilities were made available to financial service firms that were non-prime dealers, and later those
facilities were extended to commercial firms when the commercial paper
markets froze after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. A facility was also
created to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from money market
72
73
mutual funds. After an initial rejection, the Targeted Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), the $700 billion bailout program for financial service
firms, was passed by Congress to inject capital into those struggling institu74
tions. FDIC insurance was increased to $250,000, and an FDIC guarantee
75
was extended to debt issuance by financial service firms. This, of course,
created an increased, moral hazard.
In the meantime, the economy fell into recession. Unemployment
rates were up, while sales and manufacturing were trending sharply downward. The housing market was in a near historic slump as new housing
66 Standard & Poor’s, Subprime Write-Downs Could Reach $285 Billion, But Are Likely Past The
Halfway Mark, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us
/page.article/4,5,5,1,120483 4027864.html.
67 In 2007, financial service companies supplied about 22 percent of the market value of the S&P
500 index. As 2009 began, that number had dropped to 12.5 percent. Gretchen Morgrnson, The End of
Banking as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at BU1, 6.
68 Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Answering Morgan Stanley Riddle—CEO Selection Holds Key
to What the Firm, and Wall Street, Become, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at C1.
69 Andy Kessler, The End of Citi’s Financial Supermarket, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at A11.
70 Ron Lieber, Your Insurance Company, and Related Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at B1.
71 Edmund L. Andrews, Fed’s Minutes Reveal Shock at Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at
B1.
72 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081202b.htm.
73 Robert Pear, Reconsidering a Key Vote, Under Intense Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at
A11.
74 12 U.S.C.A. §§5202 et seq. (2008).
75 Tara Siegel Bernard, Reassessing Safety of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at B1.
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starts dwindled to a fifty-year low and existing home sales dropped. This
had a ripple effect throughout the economy as construction workers were
laid off, real estate agents idled, mortgage brokers closed, and other direct
78
and indirect participants in the real estate market were sidelined. The
automakers were also in extremis as automobile sales plunged. Chrysler
and General Motors were saved from bankruptcy, at least temporarily, by a
cash infusion from the federal government in the waning days of the Bush
79
administration.
VI. SELL SIDE REFORMS—TREASURY BLUEPRINT
The subprime crisis has given rise to a cry for more regulation, whatever its form and whatever its efficacy. Fortunately, there is all ready on the
table a proposal by the Treasury Department for a comprehensive reform of
U.S. financial services regulation that reflects common sense, rather than
80
hysteria. That proposal was a result of a study conducted by Treasury in
81
response to concerns over the existing financial regulatory system. Ironically, those concerns were focusing on the effects of too much regulation,
82
particularly the Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002.
As a part of its study, the Department sought public comment on a
number of issues concerning the existing financial regulatory structure. Of
particular interest was the Department’s request for comment on whether
the “increasing convergence of products across the traditional ‘functional’
regulatory lines of banking, insurance, securities, and futures” justifies
changes in the regulatory system to assure that regulatory boundary lines do
83
not unnecessarily inhibit competition. The Department received over 350
76 Jack Healy, Markets Finish Little Changed Despite Bleak Reports on Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2009, at B3.
77 Jack Healy, October Report Shows Home Prices Down 18% From Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2008, at B3.
78 By the middle of February 2009, the U.S. had lost 3.6 million jobs and the unemployment rate
reached 7.6 percent, the highest such rate in sixteen years. High Anxiety, NEWSDAY (New York), Feb.
19, 2009, at A39.
79 Jim Jelter, Corporate News: GM Wins New Loan Facility, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 2009, at B5.
80 Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar.
2008) (hereinafter “Treasury Blueprint”).
81 72 Fed. Reg. 58939 (Oct. 17, 2007). A number of blue-ribbon committees had examined the
U.S. financial regulatory structure and concluded that it was impairing the nation’s ability to compete in
financial services in a global market. See Mayor of New York, Michael R. Bloomberg & Senator
Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York's and the US Global Financial Services Leadership (Jan.
2007); Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, the Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity
Markets (Dec. 4, 2007); Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, the Competitive Position of the U.S.
Public Equity Markets (Dec. 4, 2007); Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the
21st Century (U.S. Chamber of Commerce March 2007); and Financial Services Roundtable, "The
Blueprint for U.S. Financial Competitiveness (2007).
82 Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.745 (2002).
83 72 Fed. Reg. 58939 (Oct. 17, 2007).
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84

comment letters on this topic. This was obviously a subject that the financial community thought was important.
The Treasury Department then published its “Blueprint” for financial
services regulatory reform that recommended a broad restructuring of this
85
chaotic financial services regulatory structure. Not surprisingly, the Blueprint expressed concern that functional regulation was ineffective and was
undermining America’s traditional competitive advantage in financial ser86
vices. The Blueprint prophetically asserted that functional regulation “exhibit[ed] several inadequacies, the most significant being the fact that no
single regulator possesses all of the information and authority necessary to
monitor systemic risk, or the potential that events associated with financial
institutions may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults that affect
the financial system so significantly that the real economy is adversely af87
fected.”
The Blueprint contrasted the functional regulatory approach in America with regulatory mechanisms abroad. England Germany, Japan and dozens of other countries use a consolidated regulator, along with a central
88
bank, to impose regulation through a single rulebook approach. Those
countries also eschew the “rules-based” approach used by most of the multitude of regulators in the United States. Rather, those overseas regulators
use a “principles” based approach that generally prescribes the goals of
89
regulation and allows the industry to choose how to reach those goals.
Interestingly, the Treasury Blueprint declined to adopt a single regulator approach, probably because of objections by the existing regulators.
Instead, the Blueprint recommended that the United States adopt a so-called
“Twin Peaks” approach to regulation that is used in Australia and the Neth90
erlands. The Twin Peaks approach is objectives-based and focuses on specific regulatory goals. The concept of twin peaks envisions some regulatory
84 U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions David G. Nason, Remarks Before
the City of London Corporation, Redesigning U.S. Financial Regulation for a Global Marketplace (Dec.
11, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp726.htm.
85 Treasury Blueprint, supra note 80.
86 The Blueprint noted that:

Due to its sheer dominance in the global capital markets, the U.S. financial services industry for
decades has been able to manage the inefficiencies in its regulatory structure and still maintain its
leadership position. Now, however, maturing foreign financial markets and their ability to provide
alternate sources of capital and financial innovation in a more efficient and modern regulatory system are pressuring the U.S. financial services industry and its regulatory structure.
Treasury Blueprint, supra note 80, at 2.
87 Id. at 4.
88 Id. at 141.
89 An exception is the Commodity futures Trading Commission that adopted a principles-based
regulatory system under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-544, 114
Stat. 2763.
90 Treasury Blueprint, supra note 80, at 142
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consolidation, particularly through the creation of bodies that would focus
on prudential supervision, market stability and a single business practices
regulator that would govern business conduct and consumer protection.
The Treasury Blueprint also sought to expand federal charters to most
large financial institutions including insurance companies that, heretofore,
have escaped federal regulation. The optional federal charter for insurance
companies would remove insurance electing such a charter to escape the
scrutiny of 50 state insurance regulators. Under the Treasury Blueprint, a
federal Office of National Insurance would oversee the federally chartered
91
insurance companies.
The regulatory structure proposed by the Blueprint would preempt
most other state regulation of financial institutions. However, this would cut
off the career paths of many budding state politicians who witnessed the
rise of Eliot Spitzer to become a national figure as a result of his attacks on
Wall Street. Spitzer’s successor, Andrew Cuomo, is now the most recent
and prominent of these wannabes. Naturally, the states were not about to
take this recommendation lying down. The North America Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) announced its own plan for reform on
November 19, 2008 that recommended the preservation of state and federal
regulation, but admitted that some streamlining might be in order. NASAA
advocated, however, that all financial products and markets be subject to
regulation so that there would be no regulatory gaps. It was in favor of
principles based regulation, but only as an additional layer to existing rules.
92
It also wanted to toughen enforcement and strengthen private remedies.
The Treasury Blueprint faced other obstacles. It was issued just before
the subprime crisis was in full bloom, so it did not fully address the problems in that market. The Blueprint did recommend that mortgage brokers be
93
regulated and that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be restructured, a recom94
mendation that came before their failure. There were other players that
attracted regulatory interest outside the Blueprint as the subprime crisis
exploded. These included the non-bank lenders that built the subprime mar95
ket in the 1990s, many of which failed on their own , such as the Country96
wide Financial Group that had to be rescued by Bank of America, and

91

Treasury Blueprint, supra note 80, at 128-33.
NASAA
to
Host
Financial
Services
Regulatory
Reform
Roundtable.
http://www.nasaa.org/NASAA_Newsroom/Current_NASAA_Headlines/9910.cfm (last visited Jan. 10,
2009).
93 Treasury Blueprint, supra note 80.
94 Id.
95 PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, Chain of Blame, HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE
MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 44-45, 239 (2008).
96 Louise Story and Julie Creswell, Love Was Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU1.
92
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many others which were acquired by and caused the failure of the large
97
investment banks.
VII. REGULATION IN A TIME OF HYSTERIA
Unfortunately, the careful analytical approach taken by the Treasury
Blueprint is being abandoned. The present climate of political hysteria suggests that more regulation will simply be heaped onto the existing structure
without regard to its cost or efficacy. But just adding more regulation for
regulation sake or to punish failed business executives is not a solution.
Such regulatory efforts solve no problems and will only make recovery
more difficult. Focus should, instead, be on the causes of the problems that
led to the subprime crisis and how best to deal with those issues.
To be sure, there is plenty of blame to go around. To name a few: there
is the Congress and the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
that pushed the banks and GSEs into the subprime market; regulators of
every stripe who failed to anticipate the collapse of the subprime market;
mortgage lenders who abandoned many of the most basic credit assessment
guidelines; mortgage brokers that originated subprime mortgages for fees
regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower; rating agencies that under estimated the risks of subprime securitizations; appraisers that inflated
98
their reports; and the under-capitalized monoline insurers that failed to
99
recognize the risks from subprime lending.
Those actors may be in need of scrutiny to define the reasons behind
their failures so that more caution can be exercised in the future. But more
97 For Example, Merrill Lynch acquired First Franklin, Wachovia acquired Golden West Financial
Corp., and Citigroup acquired Associates First Capital Corp. See Paul Muolo & Mathew Padilla, Chain
of Blame, How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis 24-26 (2008); Michael Moss &
Geraldine Fabrikant, The Reckoning, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash, Citigroup Buys Parts
of a Troubled Lender, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2007, at C4.
98 John Leland, Officials Say They are Falling Behind on mortgage Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2007, at A18.
99 The monolines simply did not have the capital to support their subprime guarantees. Because of
modeling errors, they underestimated the risk from those guarantees and were forced to default as the
subprime market became unglued. The result was that the monoline insurers had their credit ratings
downgraded, which in turn caused the instruments they graded as AAA to be downgraded. See generally
Alison Tudor, Nomura, Daiwa Profits On Way Up, Shares Not —Weak Momentum Behind Earnings
Fails to Fuel Rally, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008 at C2 (describing losses from such downgrades). One of
the larger monolines, MBIA announced MBIA announced in February 2009 that it was dividing itself
into two arms, one for municipal bond insurance and the other for structured investments and other nonmunicipal business. MIBIA denied that this was an effort to create a “good bank—bad bank” structure.
In the meantime the market for new municipal bond offerings had froze because of concerns with the
stability of MIBIA and other municipal bond insurers. Serena Ng, Crisis on Wall Street -- MBIA's Toxic
Cleanup: Carving Out Muni Unit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at C3.
The monolines were not regulated under state insurance laws because their credit guarantees were
not viewed to be an “insurable interest” that would fall within the insurance statue. See generally New
York State Department of Insurance, Office of General Counsel, Opinion concerning Weather Financial
Instruments (derivatives, hedges, etc.), Feb. 15, 2000 (discussing this concept).
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regulation simply because of a failure of business judgment provides no
panacea. Regulation has never prevented failure before, why should we
expect that it would do so in the future? Indeed, the investment banks that
failed were among the most heavily regulated institutions in the world, but
regulation did not prevent their failure. Another good example of the fallacy
of adding more regulation without consideration of its efficacy is the rating
agencies that were subject to regulation by the SEC after they continued to
give high ratings to Enron, WorldCom and others until just before their col100
lapse. Even now more regulation is being heaped on the rating agencies
by the SEC as the result of their modeling errors in granting Triple-A ratings to thousands of subprime instruments that had to be subsequently
101
downgraded to junk bond status. Undoubtedly, that regulation will have
no effect on the prevention or prediction of future crises.
Instead of adding more regulation for regulation’s sake, focus is
needed on the failures that actually led to the crisis. The problems that lie at
the heart of the subprime crisis are, first and foremost, federal housing policy that forced banks to make loans on the basis of social policy, rather than
the credit worthiness of the borrower. To the extent the government wishes
to encourage homeownership for the poor that should have been done by
direct subsidies, not through coercive lending policies imposed on private
sector banks. Banks should return to extending credit based solely on the
ability of the borrower to service the debt.
Another culprit in the subprime crisis is the accounting requirement
for “fair value” treatment of subprime and other tradable assets. Under “fair
value” accounting requirements those securities had to be valued at existing
price levels. However, the subprime market was frozen and the only avail102
able prices were at distressed fire sale prices. The fair value accounting
requirement required banks to value their subprime exposures at those distress prices even though they might not reflect the actual value of the in100 See The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (109 Pub. L. No. 291, 120 Stat. 1327,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §780-7). The rating agencies had been used by the SEC, bank regulators and the
CFTC as a means for valuing instruments for capital requirements and other purposes, including limitations on the investments of money market funds. The rating agencies were designated as “nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSROs”) for that purpose. Jerry W. Markham & Thomas
Lee Hazen, 23 Broker Dealer Operations Under Securities and Commodities Law: Financial Responsibilities, Credit Regulation, and Customer Protection §4:22.50 (2008).
101 See Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select
Credit Rating Agencies (SEC July 2008) (describing defects in credit rating agency procedures for rating
mortgage-backed debt And discussing proposed new regulations). Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, has asserted that financial institutions erred in outsourcing their risk management to the
rating agencies. He charged that the rating agencies had diluted the Triple A rating by giving that gold
standard rating to over 64,000 structured finance instruments, while only 12 companies in the entire
world held such a high rating. Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 7.
102 Emily Chasen, Is Fair Value Accounting Really Fair? Reuters, Feb. 26, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN1546484120080226.
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strument on a long term basis. This requirement resulted in massive write
103
downs of subprime assets on the books of financial service firms. The
effect of those write downs was to cause the investment banks to report
massive losses that completely undercut their share prices and destroyed
their credibility in the market. Under such circumstances, cash flow, historical cost or other recognized valuation methods should be used instead of
artificial values derived from a market dislocation caused by a panic. Unfortunately, such reform is unlikely as the SEC and other government bodies continue to defend fair value accounting, blaming the failures of banks
104
and investment banks on other problems, calling it a “run on the bank.” It
is not as if we learn from past events:
What many people do not realize is that mark-to-market accounting
existed in the Great Depression and, according to Milton Friedman,
was an important reason behind many bank failures. In 1938, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt called on a commission to study the problem and
105
the rule was finally suspended.
Another flaw that must be addressed is really the key to the whole
subprime disaster. Mathematical models used by the underwriters of subprime securitizations, the monoline insurers, the rating agencies and the
investment banks all failed. Risk modeling took on new importance in financial markets with the creation of the Black-Scholes options pricing
106
model in 1973. This pricing formula gave rise to a widespread belief that
the risks from complex financial instruments could be scientifically predicted with some degree of certainty. For example, a risk model developed
by David Li, a “Gaussian Copula” model, did for collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs) what Black-Scholes did for options, it was thought to have
107
allowed CDOs to be valued through mathematical formulas. In wide103 Liz Moyer, How fair is Fair Value Accounting?, Forbes.Com, June 25, 2008, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/24/accounting-banking-sec-biz-cx_lm_0625sec.html.
104 SEC, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting 3 (Dec. 30, 2008). Congress directed
the SEC to consider whether fair value accounting should be suspended, but the SEC declined to do so.
S.E.C. Elects to Keep Mark-to-Market Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2008, at B2. Accounting authorities
eventually allowed alternate valuations through cash flow assessments when there was a “temporary”
impairment in value. Banks Get Break With ‘Fair Value,’ Newsday, Oct. 11, 2008, at A20. However, that
action was too little and too late to save the investment banks and there was much confusion over what
was temporary.
105 Brian S. Wesbury and Robert Stein, Mr. President, Suspend Mark-To-Market, Forbes.com,
January 21, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/20/accounting-treasury-obama-oped-cx_bw_rs_
0121wesburystein.html.
106 http://www.riskglossary.com/link/black_scholes_1973.htm.
107 This was a computerized model that weighed the likelihood that the companies whose leveraged loan debt is placed in a CDO will default. It was based on the “broken heart” concept familiar to
actuaries, i.e., individuals die faster than they otherwise do after the death of a spouse. The CDO model
uses risk assessments for each leveraged loan in the CDO and then correlates those risk assessments to
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spread use were the value at risk (“VAR”) models that financial institutions
108
used to assess the risk from their portfolios and proprietary trading. Those
models even became the basis for capital requirements in Basel II for banks
109
worldwide. However, those VAR models failed to predict the massive
losses sustained by commercial banks in the United States and Europe from
subprime exposures.
The use of VAR models for setting capital requirements was extended
by the SEC in recent years to the large investment banks that it regulated
110
through the concept of “consolidated supervised entity” treatment. The
failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and problems at
Morgan Stanley were blamed on the adoption of the consolidated super111
vised unity status for those firms. “Under the traditional [SEC net capital
rule] rule, broker-dealers could not exceed a 12-1 [leverage] ratio, but when
Bear Stearns became insolvent, its debt-to-capital ratio was 33-to-1; at the
112
time of its merger agreement, Merrill's was reportedly 40-to-1.”
All of these models failed during the subprime crisis. In retrospect, the
reason for this is quite clear. Those models relied on historical prices generated by a rising market that overlooked the perfect storm that became the
subprime crisis. They made no allowance for the hundred-year storm, the
“black swan,” the “fat tail” outliers that occurred during the subprime cri-

determine the likelihood of defaults that would affect the lowest tranches in the CDO. Steven Hsu,
Gaussian Copula and Credit Derivatives, http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2005/09/gaussian-copula-andcredit-derivatives.html (Sept. 12, 2005).
108 See generally Elene Spanakos, Harmonization of International Adequacy Rules for Securities
Firms: An Argument to Implement the Value at Risk Approach by Adopting Basil’s Internal Model Methodology, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 221 (2000) (discussing the role of VAR).
109 However, Basel II was not fully agreed upon by federal regulators in the U.S. until July 2007.
David Wighton, Deal eached on Applying Basel Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 21-22, 2007, at
2.
110 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-54255 (July 31, 2006). The consolidated supervised
unity status regimen was actually a requirement imposed by the European Union on banks and other
financial service firms operating within its borders, which of course included the large U.S. investment
banks. The SEC acted through its consolidated supervised entity program to accommodate that requirement. Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, 23 Broker Dealer Operations Under Securities and
Commodities Law: Financial Responsibilities, Credit Regulation, and Customer Protection §4:42.50
(2008).
111 Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2008, at A1. Previously, the SEC had applied its net capital rule, a liquidity measure, to those firms. 17
C.F.R. §15c3-1.
112 John Sandman, CSE Program A Failed Experiment, Financial Times Securities Industry News,
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d7aff10dba98c40c875.ca487a589f559&docnum=2&_fmtstr
=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlWzSkAW&_md5=d3869cf0f4e3b95b7023c520f51b7f02&focBu
dTerms=capital%20and%20consolidated%20supervision%20 and%20SEC&focBudSel=all. Risk-based
capital models were also adopted by the CommodityFTC, but with better results because it was tied to
exchange margin requirements that more accurately valued risks. 69 Fed. Reg. 49784 (Aug. 12, 2004).
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113

sis. However, as we have now learned, once again, a hurricane Katrina
will strike on occasion. Risk models must account for this possibility.
Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO at Goldman Sachs, published an op-ed
piece in the Financial Times in which he identified what he believed were
the flaws in the financial system that had led to the subprime crisis. They
are worthy of attention. He points risk management failures as the problem,
such as over reliance on risk modeling that did not take into account “mul114
tiple standard deviation of events.” Risk managers also erroneously assumed positions could be fully hedged, and they failed to account for offbalance-sheet risks. Blankfein further thought that the investment banks had
not been able to keep up operationally with the complexity of the risks pre115
sented by new financial instruments.
Blankfein was right to have targeted these practices. The risks from
subprime mortgages were simply passed in a circle in many instances or
dumped on a party that did not have the capital to absorb the loss. If these
risks had been properly modeled, counterparty assessment would have been
more thorough, and many subprime mortgages would never have been
originated because no buyer would accept them.
VIII. BUY SIDE REFORMS—MORTGAGE REFORMATIONS
Most attention during the Bush administration was focused on the sell
side of the mortgage market during the subprime crisis, which essentially
meant bailing out the financial institutions that were so badly damaged by
their participation in that market. Many critics contended that more focus
should have been placed on aiding homeowners who were losing their
homes by the thousands as foreclosures mounted.
On July 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the HOPE for
116
Homeowners Act that allowed the Federal Housing Authority (“FHA”) to
insure up to $300 billion in new refinanced mortgages for poor and dis-

113 Value at risk models failed to account for unusual market events. Those outliers were a well
known danger. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN, THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE xviii (2007) (describing the dangers of events that have low predictability and large impact
and noting that portfolio managers use risk assessment measures that exclude the possibility of a black
swan).
114 Blankfein also believed that companies had not accurately priced the subprime instruments
held in their portfolios. He asserted that Goldman Sachs practice of daily marking of positions to market
allowed it to avoid the worst of the subprime losses. Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential
Catalyst of Risk, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 7.
115 Blankfein also believed that companies had not accurately priced the subprime instruments
held in their portfolios. He asserted that Goldman Sachs practice of daily marking of positions to
market allowed it to avoid the worst of the subprime losses. Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the
Essential Catalyst of Risk, Financial Times (London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 7.
116 Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2800 (July 30, 2008).
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117

tressed borrowers. It was initially estimated that this would allow some
400,000 homeowners to refinance their mortgages on more favorable terms
118
by converting them into government guaranteed mortgages. However, the
institutions underwriting the original loans would have to forgive some of
the principal because the refinanced mortgages could not have more than a
119
90 percent loan to value ratio. This would require the lender to reduce the
amount of the mortgage to that level. Since housing prices were falling rapidly that could be a significant write off. Another problem was that many
of the mortgages otherwise qualifying for the program had been securitized.
In order to adjust the terms of the underlying mortgages in those securitized
pools, at least in some instances, approval of the investors purchasing the
instruments would be required. Only 357 individuals signed up for this voluntary program and only a handful of mortgage holders had received any
120
relief under the program by February 2009. The Department of Housing
and Urban Development blamed this little amount of applications on high
121
fees and restricted eligibility requirements. As a result only a handful of
mortgages were refinanced under this program.
The Bush Administration announced the creation of a program called
Hope Now in October 2007. This was an alliance between the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, mortgage lenders and loan counselors
that was intended to provide voluntary assistance and counseling to homeowners in trouble with their mortgage. Within a few months, some 4,500
persons were calling the Hope Now hot line each day, but were receiving
122
little assistance in dealing with their mortgage paayments.
In December 2007, at the request of Henry Paulson, Secretary of the
Treasury Department, several large mortgage lenders agreed to create new
programs that would allow potentially defaulting subprime borrowers to
refinance their mortgages on more affordable terms or to freeze their float117 Kevin G. Hall, Public Sector Eyes New Ways to Absorb Private Insolvency, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS (Tennessee), Dec. 5, 2008, at C3.
118 Evan Page, Federal Housing Help Falls Short: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 249, 254 (2008).
119 http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/HousingandEconomicRecoveryActSummary.pdf.
The
legislation also created an Affordable Housing Trust Fund that was to be financed by $900 million in
fees from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which subsequently failed. David M. Herszenhorn, Approval is
Near for Bill to Help U.S. Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at A1.
120 Statement of John Taylor President & Chief Executive Officer National Community Reinvestment Coalition Committee on House Financial Services on Feb. 3, 2009, available
athttp://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2468b380eae69085cc5669b7d49546ee&docnum=4&_fmt
str=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAA&_md5=96b8235b94dbabbe1e4de08098cd209
f&focBudTerms=hope%20 and%20357%20and%20foreclosure&focBudSel=all.
121 Another program called FHASecure was developed to provide relief to some 80,000 homeowners who were delinquent on adjustable interest rate resets. However, that program provided relief to
only 4100 homeowners and the program was dropped at the end of December 2008. Brian Collins, HUD
Kills FHA Secure Effort, 33 Nat’l Mtg. News 15 (Jan. 5, 2009).
122 Lynnley Browning, SOS Unanswered, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2008, at C1.
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123

ing interest rates for a period of five years. Paulson also asked mortgage
lenders to ease loan terms for borrowers above the subprime level. He noted
that foreclosures were rising even for prime rate mortgages. Although some
lenders began to restructure mortgages so that delinquent homeowners
would not have to default and go into foreclosure, that process was slow to
124
get off the ground.
It was in the interest of lenders in many instances to make such adjustments because declining housing prices would result, in any event, in a
“short” sale that would return less than the amount covered by the mortgage. As a consequence of the continuing decline in the housing market, the
number of mortgage adjustments increased. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. announced at the end of 2008 that it would began a program of modifying
mortgages to ease terms for borrowers. It expanded that program in January
2009 to extend to the more than $1 trillion of mortgage loans that it had
125
securitized.
There was much debate in the Bush administration over whether there
should be a larger bailout of homeowners who could not meet their mortgage payments. Secretary Paulson objected to such relief, while Sheila Bair,
126
the head of the FDIC was seeking such a rescue. President-elect, Barack
127
Obama announced that he was in favor of providing such relief. True to
his word, on February 18, 2009, President Obama announced a $200 billion
plan to provide relief for mortgage loan modifications for homes that were
under water through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On the same day
Freddie Mac completed a $10 billion loan offering, the largest in its history.
Another $75 billion was to be used by the Obama Adminisration for private
lender loan modification programs. The plan sought to limit loan payments
to 31 percent of the borrower’s income. Borrowers would be given a $1,000
per year “pay for success” fee for meeting mortgage payments after modifi128
cation.
There is some precedent for greater government intervention in restructuring mortgages contracts. The farming crisis that occurred during the
Great Depression in the 1930s included a massive number of foreclosures
on farms and caused much unrest and protests. Congress passed the Frazier-

123 Edmund L. Andrews and Vikas Bajaj, Lenders Agree to Freeze Rates on Some Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, (Dec. 6, 2007).
124 See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Relief for Homeowners is Given a Relative Few, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008) (noting that this process started slowly).
125 Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Expands Loan Effort, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2009, at B1.
126 Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target With $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at BU4
(Paulson was in a “tong war” with Bair over the issue).
127 Edmund L. Andrews, Treasury Denounced Over Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at B1.
128 Laura Meckler, Housing Bailout at $275 Billion—Obama Plan Would Fund Loan Modifications, Cover More Losses at Mortgage Titans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A1.

404

FIU Law Review

[4:381

129

Lemke Act in 1934 in an effort to alleviate some of that suffering. This
legislation required appraisals of foreclosed farms in bankruptcy proceedings. The farmer could then seek to have the mortgage holder sell the property at its appraised value under a new six-year mortgage with annual payments set at 2.5 percent of the principal for the first five years, after which
payments doubled to 5 percent. Annual interest at a rate of 1 percent was
required to be paid on all unpaid balances. If the mortgage holder refused
such an arrangement, the bankruptcy court was required to stay all proceedings for five years with the farmer retaining possession of the farm during
that period, providing that he paid a reasonable rent. However, the Supreme
130
Court held that that legislation was unconstitutional.
The residential mortgage market was also in crisis during the Great
Depression. In an effort to rejuvenate that market, the Home Owners Loan
131
Act of 1933 created the Home Owner’s Loan Corp. (HOLC), which was
overseen by members of the FHLB. HOLC was funded by a $200 million
subscription from the Treasury Department through funds obtained from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). HOLC was also authorized to
issue its own bonds that were backed by a government guarantee. Initially,
that guarantee was only for interest, but not principal payments. However,
the guarantee was extended to principal payments as well in 1934 in order
to make those bonds more marketable. The eventual amount of bonds au132
thorized for issuance total $4.75 billion.
HOLC was authorized to exchange its bonds for residential mortgages
in an amount not to exceed 80 percent of the value of the property. If the
lender did not want to accept the bonds, HOLC was authorized to pay cash
for up to 40 percent of the value of the property. Single-family residences
eligible for this mortgage relief could not be valued at more than $17,500.
HOLC was also authorized to advance funds to homeowners who had already lost their homes in foreclosure proceedings so that they might be recovered. Purchases of defaulted mortgages injected new funds into the
S&Ls, providing liquidity and allowing them to make new loans and con133
tinue their business.
HOLC’s mission was to stop the massive foreclosures that were then
occurring on home mortgages. It was to achieve that goal by replacing defaulted or troubled mortgages with new mortgages on terms that the home-

129

73 Pub. L. No. 486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). The farming crisis was also
attacked through a number of crop loan and subsidy arrangements. Jerry W. Markham, II, A Financial
History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investors (1900-1970), 214-15
(2002).
131 73 Pub. L. No. 4348 Stat. 134 (1933).
132 C. Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 11-12 (1951).
133 Id.
130
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owners could meet. This was accomplished by purchasing the troubled
mortgages from banks and then new mortgages were issued to the homeowners on more lenient terms of 15-year maturities at a 5 percent interest
rate. HOLC converted the prevalent short-term mortgages into long-term
134
loans that were amortized over the life of the mortgage. This allowed the
homeowners to reduce dependence on short-term refinancings and shielded
them from a requirement that they make a larger balloon payment only a
few years after taking out the loan. Homeowners were able to remain in
their homes and build up equity over the years. This loan structure became
the model for the “conventional” mortgages that exist even today.
Between 1933 and 1936, HOLC took over more than 1 million home
135
loans. HOLC eventually purchased about 20 percent of all home mortgages during the Great Depression. The total number of loans applied for
totaled about 1.9 million with a value of $6.1 billion, which was about half
of the outstanding residential real estate debt. Notwithstanding the leniency
of the new loans, there was still a 20 percent default rate on the mortgages
purchased by HOLC. It ended up owning some 200,000 houses, which were
sold over a period of several years. At one point, HOLC held an inventory
136
of over 100,000 homes. When HOLC was disbanded in 1951 it returned
137
$14 million to the Treasury as surplus. Nevertheless, HOLC critics
138
charged that the program did more to help lenders than borrowers. In fact,
those efforts actually did little or nothing to restore the mortgage market.
Rather, that recovery came with World War II, during which a housing
shortage arose.
IX. CONCLUSION
The nation is at a turning point in its history. Many of our leading financial institutions have collapsed or have been effectively nationalized by
the federal government. There is even concern that some of those financial
139
institutions will be socialized. This is a most dangerous situation, and
every effort must be made to liquidate the government’s ownership interest
in those institutions as rapidly as possible. Equally important is assuring
134
135
136
137

Alex J. Pollock, A 1930s Loan Rescue Lesson, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2008, at A17.
C. Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 11-12 (1951).
Id. at 71-75 (1951).
C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORPORATION 160

(1951).
138

ROBERT S. MCELVAINE. THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AMERICA (1929-1941) 162 (1961).
That socialization is already underway. Bank of America was forced to agree to limits on executive compensation and the government was dictating its dividend and lending policies as conditions
for the bank to receive additional cash infusion and troubled asset guarantees telling $135 billion.
Louise Story, et al., Bank of America Posts Loss as it Gets New U.S. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at
A4; U.S. Treasury Dept., Treasury Issues Additional Executive Compensation Rules Under TARP (Jan.
19, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1364.htm.
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that the restructuring of the financial services regulatory system is done in a
way that does not unnecessarily impair business or impose unnecessary
costs. Certainly, there is a need for regulatory reform, and the Treasury
Blueprint provides a useful model. However, at the end of the day, we must
recognize that regulation cannot stop business cycles. It can only impair
recovery. The financial system will rebuild itself and begin another cycle of
prosperity. Unfortunately, that period of prosperity will inevitably lead to
another downturn and to another crisis, as has occurred throughout history.
We should also remember that the New Deal regulatory structure that
created the federal securities laws and separated the investment banks and
commercial banks through the Glass-Steagall Act did nothing to restore the
economy during the Great Depression. To the contrary, it inhibited capital
investment. It was only the outbreak of war in Europe that saved the econ140
omy, not full disclosure or regulation of bank activities. New Deal regulation provided no shelter afterwards. The SEC was incapable of detecting or
preventing the Enron era scandals, the subprime crisis or even Bernard
141
Madoff’s monstrous $50 billion Ponzi scheme.
In the present environment, there will be much hysteria that will divert
attention away from the real causes of the subprime crisis.. Demands are
142
already being made for more SEC style “transparency” regulation. No
one seems to know whether or how more transparency will prevent future
financial crises. The term transparency is simply tossed out in much the
way the terms “organic” and “sustainable” are being used to sell everything
from eggs to mattresses. No one seems to really know what those terms
mean or what benefits they might bestow on our health or the environment
that might justify their higher costs, but we must have them anyway. What
the Nation really needs to focus on is the fact that transparency has been
mandated since 1933 for the financial services firms that failed during the
subprime crisis. Those firms were also exhaustively regulated by the SEC.
That transparency and regulation provided no protection from the perfect

140 For the case against the New Deal see Jim Powell, FDR’s Folly, How Roosevelt and His New
Deal Prolonged the Great Depression (2003). The Obama administration is facing a monumental task in
dealing with the ongoing subprime crisis. It is doubtful that the massive infrastructure building program
that he is proposing will be of any benefit to restoring the economy. That same action was tried in the
Great Depression and failed.
141 The SEC had been alerted several times that there might be something amiss in Madoff’s
operations. Alex Berenson, ’92 Ponzi Case Missed Signals About Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at
A1. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox subsequently expressed concern over his agency’s handling of this
affair. He found “deeply troubling” that the SEC had “credible and specific warnings” of the Ponzi
scheme for some time. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Knew Him as Foe and Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2009, at B1.
142 See, e.g., Robert M. Morgenthau, Too Much Money Is Beyond Legal Reach, WALL ST. J., Sept.
30, 2008, at A19. (“A major factor in the current financial crisis is the lack of transparency in the activities of the principal players in the financial markets.”).
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storm that arose during the subprime crisis and will shield no one from the
143
next one.

143 In apparent recognition of the past failure of “transparency” regulations, reformers are now
demanding “true” transparency. Bill Bradley, Five Ways to Restore Financial Trust, WALL ST. J., Feb.
19, 2009, at A19. Yet, SEC regulations already require “full” disclosure. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). Existing SEC regulations also prohibit untrue transparency
and require disclosure of every “material” fact. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.

